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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

I

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

JOHN EDWARD COWAN,
(
Defendant-Appellant. )

Case No.

12373

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal by John Edward Cowan, from
a jury verdict of guilty to the crime of unlawful sale of a
narcotic drug, rendered in the Third Judicial District of
Salt Lake, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant, John Edward Cowan, was found
guilty of the crime of the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug,
and sentenced to an indeterminate term as provided by
law. The defendant filed a motion for new trial on which
a hearing was held. The Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson
denied the motion on November 30, 1970.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State prays that the defendant's conviction and
sentence of from five years to life be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Ronald Bridgeforth a confidential informant
with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (T.
78) told the agents Mr. Sumega and Mr. Bullock in February of 1970 that he had information or independent
knowledge that Cowan was selling drugs (T. 82). Approximately a week and a half or two weeks before Mr.
Bridgeforth and Officer Kramer made a "buy" from
Cowan, Mr. Bridgeforth had a conversation with Cowan
during which conversation Cowan had stated that he was
selling marijuana or he could get it to sell (T. 83). On
the basis of these conversations Mr. Bridgeforth knew
Cowan was dealing in drugs (T. 83).
On the 23rd of February 1970 at approximately 1:02
p.m. Officer Charles Kramer, along with Mr. Bridgeforth
were sitting in Officer Kramer's personal vehicle at the
end of Columbus Street behind the Utah State Capit:-01
(T. 30, 31). A pre-arranged meeting had been made with
Cowan for the purpose of purchasing about $500.00 worth
of marijuana from Cowan. After driving up in a yellow
mustang, Cowan came up to the passenger side of the
vehicle where Mr. Bridgeforth was sitting and asked if
they had all the money (T. 31). Cowan then asked Mr.
Bridgeforth and Officer Kramer to follow him, where they
proceeded to the Wasatch Springs parking lot (T. 31).

Cowan then handed Officer Kramer two packages and
Mr. Bridgeforth one, which Mr. Bridgeforth partially
opened up and inspected, and it appeared to be marijuana
(T. 34).

Officer Kramer handed Cowan $300.00 and Mr.
Bridgeforth handed him $200.00. Before Cowan left he
informed Officer Kramer and Mr. Bridgeforth how they
could go ahead and make other deals with him over the
(T. 34). Cowan told Mr. Bridgeforth and Officer Kramer to call him, identify themselves, and to give
a time. The first time would be how many "kis" of marijuana OffEcer Kramer and Mr. Bridgeforth wanted and
the
time would be the time that they were to
meet (T. 34).
Mr.

nnd Officer Kramer then met Agents
and Sumega. The marijuana was turned over to
Agents Bullock and Sumega and they placed the packages in a box to be mailed to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in Dallas, Texas. The marijuana was examined by Buddy R. Goldston, a chemist
employed by the Bureau (T. 68). Mr. Goldston analyzed
each exhibit individually by taking samples from each
one (T. 70). Mr. Goldston testified that he found marij;_1ana in every container, and described it as a narcotic
drue; <T. 70).

Cowan was found guilty by the jury of unlawfully
selling a narcotic drug. On October 21, 1970 Cowan filed
a Motion for New Trial based on newly discovered evidence. On October 27, 1970, Cowan was sentenced to the
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Utah State Prison for "an indeterminate term as provided
by law for the crime of unlawfully selling narcotic drug,
as charged" (A. C. 29). On November 5, 1970 Cowan's
Motion for New Trial was heard. The trial took the matter under advisement and on November 30, 1970, the Motion was denied (T. 128).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO SUBMIT COWAN'S JURY INSTRUCTION ON ENTRAPMENT.
Cowan denied that he had committed the offense of
unlawful sale of a narcotic drug. The general rule on entrapment as stated in 61 A. L. R. 2d 677 (1958) is as
follows:
"To invoke the defense of entrapment it must
necessarily be assumed that the act charged as
a public offense was committed and it has been
held or recognized by strong intimation or necessary inference in a number of cases that the defense of entrapment is not available to a defendant who denies that he committed the offense
charged. Id. at 677.
This rule has been repeatedly followed by the majority of courts with rare dissent. In Wilson v. United States,
409 F. 2d 184 (9th Cir. 1969) cert. den. 69 S. Ct. 2146
(1969), the defendant argued that the trial court committed error by not giving the jury instruction pertaining
to the law of entrapment. The court held that since the
defendant denied that he had committed the offense with
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which he was charged, (illegal sale of heroin) that the
defendant was not entitled to instruction on entrapment.
The same result was reached in People v. White, 26 Mich.
App. 35, 181 N. W. 2d 803 (1970). The defendant was
convicted by a jury of selling marijuana without a license,
and the defendant urged on appeal that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on defendant's
theory of entrapment.
The court held:
"Defendant denied making the sale. The defense of entrapment is not available when the
offense is denied." Id. at 804.
Even in the event that Cowan had admitted committing the offense of unlawfully selling a narcotic drug,
it still would not have been error for the trial court to
refuse to give instructions to the jury on the issue of entrapment. In State v. Grey, 69 Wash. 2d 432, 418 P. 2d
725 (1966) a case with a factual situation almost identical
to the present case, the court held there was not sufficient evidence for the trial court to give any instructions
on entrapment. In Grey, the State Police Department
had enlisted the aid of a private citizen who acted as a
police informer. He was assigned to work with a Seattle
police officer. The police informer had known the defendant for a month or more. The defendant knew that the
police informer had problems with marijuana violations
of federal law. There were a series of negotiations dealing
with the place of delivery of marijuana and the fact that
the police officer would be one of the purchasers. At the
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appointed meeting place, the defendant asked if the police
informer and police officer had the money. Before leaving the defendant turned to the officer and said. "If you
ever want to obtain any more marijuana give me a call."
Id. at 726. The defendant in Grey had never been convicted of a narcotics offense. The court stated:
"Entrapment occurs only vvhere the criminal
design originates in the mind of the police officer
and not with the accused, . . . When the crime
originates in the mind of another, an officer may,
when acting in good faith, make use of deception,
trickery or artifice....
"Even if we accept appellant's testimony that
he told the officer and the informer he did not
want to sell marijuana and was only persuaded
through friendship and sympathy, we do not have
more than the scintilla of evidence necessary for
the instruction....

"It is quite obvious that appellant was fur·
nished nothing more than an opportunity to sell."
Id. at 727. (Emphasis added.)
See also State v. Carry, 70 Wash. 2d 303, 422 P. 2d
823 (1967). State v. Acosla, 101 Ariz. 127, 416 P. 2d 560
(1966),, State v. Romero, 79 N. M. 522, 445 P. 2d 587
(1968).

An astute and extensive analysis of the issue of en·
trapment was undertaken by the Supreme Court of
Alaska in Grossman v. State, 457 P. 2d 226 (Alas. 1969).
The court held that a subjective test was inadequate and
that an "objective" test was in accord with Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U. S. 435 (1932). The court held "It
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was obvious that the issue of entrapment can be litigated
either before or during trial and should be determined by
the court and not the jury." Id. at 230.
While this court has not adopted an "objective test";
in State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421, 432 P. 2d 50 (1967)
this Court stated:
" ... On the other hand, if the defendant's attitude of mind was such that he desired and intended to commit the crime, the mere fact that an
officer or someone else afforded him the opportunity to commit it would not constitute entrapment.
. . ." Id. at 424.
In State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P. 2d 494
(1962) this Court in defining entrapment stated:
". . . When the issue is present the question
is whether the crime is the product of defendant's
own intention and desire, or is the product of some
incitement or inducement by the peace officer.
. . . On the other hand, if the defendant's attitude
of mind was such that he desired and intended to
commit the crime the mere fact that an officer
or someone else afforded him the opportunity to
commit it would not constitute entrapment which
would be a defense to its commission; and this
would not be less true even though an undercover
man went along with the defendant in the criminal plan and aided or encouraged him in it. Id.
at 151.
The facts of this case are more than clear that there
was not sufficient evidence to warrant the trial court to
give the jury an instruction on entrapment. Mr. Ronald
Bridgeforth had information and independent knowledge

that Cowan was selling drugs (T. 82). Cowan had told
Bridgeforth prior to the sale that he was selling marijuana or could get it to sell (T. 83). At the appointed
meeting place for the buy, Cowan asked if Mr. Bridgeforth and Officer Kramer had the money (T. 31). Cowan
after the sale informed Officer Kramer and Mr. Bridge.
forth exactly how they could go ahead and make other
deals with him over the telephone (T. 34). The evidence
is overwhelming that Cowan's attitude of mind was such
that he desired and intended to commit the crime.
POINT II.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING
COWAN'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Cowan's contentions that the trial court erred in de·
nying a motion for new trial are without merit. In State
v. Cooper, 114 U. 531, 201 P. 2d 764 (1969) this court
stated:
" 'It is a matter too well settled to admit of
any serious dispute ... that the question of grant·
ing or denying a motion for new trial is a matter
largely within the discretion of the trial court.
. . . We do not ordinarily interfere with the rulings
of the trial court ... unless abuse of or failure to
exercise, discretion on the part of the trial judge
is quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial judge
will be sustained.' " Id. at 543.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-3 (1953) provides,
"When a verdict or decision has been ren·
dered against the defendant the court may, upon

his application, grant a new trial in the following
cases only:
. . . (7) When new evidence has been discovered, material to the defendant and which
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial."
Cowan apparently bases his motion for new trial on
the affidavit (A. C. 21-22) which states that the "duguenois" test will react positively on stalks as well as leaves
of the marijuana, were inclusive. The "bricks" could
have been composed solely of "stalks", which according
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-1 (14) (Supp. 1971) are not
unlawful. Cowan further declares that the State of Utah
should have filed a counter affidavit to his affidavit.
In People v. Egbert, 43 C. A. 2d 117, 110 P. 2d 495
(1941) the defendant appealing from a denial for a motion of new trial, contended that no counter affidavit was
filed by the State. The court then stated.
"The Trial Court, in the exercise of its discretion, must have taken that fact into consideration in denying the motion. Whether or not the
affidavit called for an answer was a matter for
the court to decide in exercising its discretion."
Id. at 496.
Admittedly the letter from Mr. Goldston was not a counter-affidavit, for none is required under Utah Code Ann.
S 77-38-3 ( 1953). The fact that the information concerning the test performed on the marijuana was in the form
of a letter rather than a signed affidavit is not dispositive,
since the information could have been easily put in affi-
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davit form (T. 128). Mr. Goldston stated that marijuana
identification first consists of visual examination and
microscopic examination, then the Duguenois-Levine color
test is used as final confirmation. In the Ted C. Cowan
case ... "there was leaves stems and seeds present some
in the form of an intact marijuana plant" (T. 36). Agent
Sumega testified that Cowan was known to him as T. C.
which accounts for the Ted C. rather than John Edward
(T. 62). On Mr. Goldston's letter, however, apart from
Cowan's name the case number was correct.
The trial court was aware however, that there was
other evidence in addition to the "duguenois" test which
established that the substance sold by Cowan was marijuana. Harry R. Sumega, a special agent in charge of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
office in Utah testified that he had come in contact with
suspected marijuana "literally thousands of occasions"
(T. 58). Mr. Buddy R. Goldston, a chemist with the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. And during that period of time did you
specifically become familiar with a drug or nar·
cotic known as Cannabis Sativa?

A. Yes I have.
Q. And during your time at the Federal
Drug Administration and Narcotics Bureau have
you had occasion to analyze substances, the substances known to you as marijuana?
A. Yes I have.
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Q. And you have had occasion to compare
these substances with substances that you did not
know what the origin was.

A.

Yes.

Q. And approximately how many of these
analyses have you made?

A.

Over a thousand.

Q. Did you have occasion to analyze Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

A.
ually.

Yes, I did. I analyzed each one individ-

Q.

You took samples from each one of those?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And what did you find?

A.

I found marijuana is every container.

Q.

Is that also known as Cannabis Sativa?

A.

Yes, it is.

Q. Would you describe - is Cannibis Sativa
or otherwise known as marijuana a narcotic drug?

A.

Yes, it is" (T. 69, 70). (Emphasis added.)

Mr. Goldston's visual as well as chemical analysis
confirmed and substantiated that the "bricks" were indeed marijuana, a narcotic drug.
Under Federal laws, 21 U. S. C. A. § 802, 329 (Supp.
1971) , marijuana is defined practically identically to that
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-1 (14) (Supp. 1971). Mr.
Goldston was well aware of federal law in view of the
number of tests he had conducted on marijuana, there-

fore on the basis of both federal and state law, Mr. Goldston would not have described marijuana as a narcotic
drug if the sample was composed solely of exempt portions. Goldston's identification of the suspected marijuana as a narcotic drug, in view of his uncontradicted
expertise in the field, would be conclusive.
In State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P. 2d 993
(1969) this court enumerated the factors for newly discovered evidence to constitute grounds for a new trial.
"(1) It must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at trial. (2) It must not be merely cumulative. (3) It must be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case." Id.
at 153.

Cowan has failed to show that the evidence concerning the effectiveness of the "duguenois" could not have
been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable
diligence. After all Cowan was prepared on direct examination of Mr. Goldston to question the witness concerning an article in Scientific American which dealt
with marijuana. It would not appear unduly burdensome
to expect Cowan to prepare a rebuttle to counter the
testimony of the State's expert witness, Mr. Goldston.
Even assuming the "duguenois" test would also react
to "stem". Cowan has failed to show that this informa·
tion would render a different result on the retrial of the
case. An important part of the test for marijuana consists of visual examination, which would remain unaltered.

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF
GUILTY.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-1 (14) (Supp.
1971) certain portions of the marijuana plant are excluded from the classification of narcotic drugs, to wit
the mature stalk, seeks which are incapable of germination, etc. Cowan's contention that if statutorily excluded
portion of the plant were in the sample tested, that this
would render the test inconclusive, is manifest error. In
State v. Trenton, 1 Wash. App. 607, 464 P. 2d 438 (1969)
the defendant claimed that he was entitled to an instruction that it was not a crime to possess the mature stalks
or sterile seeds of the marijuana plant. The court stated:
"This contention is without merit, since the
defendant made no attempt to prove that the
seized material consisted of only mature stalks
or sterile seeds of the plant. Such was the burden
of his defense after the state has established a
prima facie case." Id. at 441. (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Montague, 73 Wash. 2d 381, 438 P. 2d 571
(1968) the defendant claimed that there was no evidence
that the material found was sufficiently identified as
marijuana. The Court dismissed the defendant's contention declaring:

"It appears to be of no consequence in the
statutory definition of narcotic and non-narcotic
portions of the statute that other parts of the
contents may be non-narcotic portions of the
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plant.... It seems plausible that many sales may
be of packages containing a mixture of narcotic
and non-narcotic portions of the plant. The state
made a prima facie case that the material in the
plastic bags included marijuana. This was sufficient." Id. at 578.
:In State v. Franco, 76 Utah 202, 289 P. 100 (1930)
the defendant objected to the testimony of officers concerning the content of marijuana. This court stated:
"This marijuana seized was introduced in evidence, and is shown to be not an extract or preparation which may be difficult or impossible of
characterization without chemical analysis but the
dried leaves, stems and seeds of the plant. One
reasonably familiar with the plant should be able
to identify it by its appearance. However, the
state very properly did not rest its case as to the
character of the drugs upon the officers' testimony. The sack and cans were taken to the state
chemist who examined and analyzed their contents and testified that it was marijuana." Id. at
207. (Emphasis added.)
Finally in People v. White, 26 Mich. App. 35, 181
N. W. 2d 803 (1970), the defendant contended that it
was incumbent upon the people in meeting their burden
of proving the essential elements of the offense i.e. that
the marijuana did not consist of the exempt portions of
the plant. The defendant further argued that since there
was no showing whether the marijuana consisted of exempt or non-exempt portions of the plant that an essential element of the offense had not been proved. The
court held that it is the defendant's responsibility to es-
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tablish that the exemptions are applicable. Further that
"... it was not incumbent upon the people in this case to
prove that the marijuana allegedly sold was non-exempt
marijuana." Id. at 807.
As several courts have considered this same frivolous
claim, the result remains that regardless whether the
marijuana included statutorily excluded portions, Cowan
was guilty of violating Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-2 (1953).
Nor is there any merit to Cowan's contention that
the Duguenois-Levin Color test is inaccurate, therefore
'invalidating the results of Mr. Goldston's analysis of the
marijuana. This test is currently utilized extensively by
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and the State urges this Court to take judicial notice of
the fact, that this is the best available chemical test for
marijuana. Furthermore, analysis of the drug also consists of microscopic and visual examination of the plants.
The chemical test is merely corroborative of the findings
bar;ed on
examination.
POINT IV.
THE SENTENCE PRONOUNCED BY THE
TRIAL COURT IS VALID AND IN ACCORD
WITH UTAH LAW.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-20 (Supp. 1971) provides
as follows:
"Whenever any person is convicted of any
crime, except treason or murder in the first degree,
committed after May 12, 1919, and the judgment
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provides for punishment in the state prison, the
court shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment;
but the sentence and judgment of imprisonment
in the state prison shall be for a period of time not
less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law for the particular
crime for which such person has been convicted.
Every such sentence, regardless of its form or
whether it, by its terms, purports to be for a
shorter or different period of time shall, nevertheless, be construed and held to be a sentence for
the term between the minimum and maximum
periods of time provided by law for the particular
crime of which the person is convicted, and shall
continue in full force and effect until the maximum period has been reached unless sooner terminated or committed by authority of the Board
of pardons." (Emphasis added.)
By statute any sentence, "regardless of its form"
shall "be construed and held to be a sentence for the
term between the minimum and maximum periods provided by law"; Id., therefore even though the judge in
pronouncing sentence does not mention the minimum
and maximum periods, the sentence will be construed to
be an indeterminate sentence between the minimum and
maximum periods. An indeterminate sentence is not an
indefinite sentence nor is it uncertain. This Court in
State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 148 P. 2d 327 (1944) declared.
"We have repeatedly held that an indefinite
sentence is a definite sentence for the maximum
term therein stated, unless it is commuted or term·
inated or the prisoner is paroled or pardoned by
the Board of Pardons. Id. at 318.
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The Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson in pronouncing
sentence on Cowan stated:
"The jud ent and sentence of this Court
Edward Cowan, be confined and
is that you,
imprisoned
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by law for the crime
of unlawfully selling a narcotic drug as charged"
(A. C. 29).
The determination of the legal sentence for the crime of
unlawful selling of narcotic drugs is not discretionary with
the trial judge but must be pronounced pursuant to statute. Cowan was convicted of Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-2
(1953).

"It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, or compound any
narcotic drug except as authorized in this act."
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-1 (15) (Supp. 1971) states
that:
"'Narcotic drugs' means coca leaves ... cannibis or marijuana and every substance which
may have a different name but is neither chemically nor physically distinguishable from them.

"

Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-44 (Supp. 1971) is the penalty section for violations to the act. Prior to amendment
by the legislature in 1969, Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-44
(1953) provided that:
"Any person violating section 58-13a-8, 58-13a16 or 58-13a-28 of this chapter shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor. Any person violating any other
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provision of this chapter shall upon conviction be
punished for the first offense by a fine of not less
than $1,000 or by imprisonment in the Utah State
prison for not exceeding five years ... and for any
subsequent violation of this act not specifically
designated as a misdemeanor - by a fine of not
less than $5,000 or by imprisonment in the Utah
State Prison for not less than five years or more
than life .... "
Prior to amendment Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-44
( 1953) then for a first offense provided the same penalty
whether the drug sold was heroin or marijuana, whether
the defendant possessed the drug or was actually selling the drug. It is quite obvious that the legislative
intent of the new penalty provision, Utah Code Ann. 9
58-13a-44 (Supp. 1971) as amended, is to provide a gradation of penalties depending on the type of drug, number
of offenses and the nature of and seriousness of the defendant's action. The new penalty section also reflects
legislative concern over increasing drug traffic in the last
few years, by providing more severe sanctions for violations of the drug laws.
Cowan was convicted of selling a narcotic drug,
specifically marijuana, Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-44(4)
(Supp. 1971) provides that:
"Every person who transports, imports into
this state, sells, furnishes, administers or gives
away, or offers, to transport, import into this state,
sell, furnish, administer, or give away or attempts
to import into this state or transports any marijuana, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison from five years to life and shall not
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be eligible for release upon completion of sentence
or on parole or on any other basis until he has
served not less than three years." (Emphasis
added.)
Cowan is correct in that the prison records do reflect that his sentence is for a term of 5 years to life,
which is precisely what is provided for by Utah Code
Ann. § 54-13a-44 (4) (Supp. 1971). Cowan's seeming bewilderment over the various penalties assessed for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-2 is rather incredulous
in view of the fact that the court specifically told the
jury the length of the sentence. "Members of the jury,
the state law provides that the penalty for this offense
is five years to life in the state prison" (T. 15).
Furthermore, Cowan's contention that the "better
view" is that the 38th Legislature created several new
substantive crimes is wholly untenable and without the
slightest merit. If as Cowan argues, Utah Code Ann. §
58-13a-44 ( 1) and 58-13a-44 ( 12) were left to cover all
other crimes, Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-2 (1953) would
be in conflict with Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-44 (2)- (11)
(Supp. 1971). By such a construction a person could sell,
for example heroin, a narcotic drug and be convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-2 and be sentenced under
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-44(12) and be given at most
a one year sentence for a first offense. However, under
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-44(4) (Supp. 1971) for the
same offense a term of 5 years to life could be pronounced.
It is an elementary principle of statutory construction
that statutes are to be read to avoid conflict. Clearly,
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as the section topic head designates Utah Code Ann.
58-13a-44 (Supp. 1971) is a penalty section for violations
of the act which contains gradations of penalty depending on the nature of the offense.
CONCLUSION
Cowan was afforded a fair trial and properly found
guilty of the crime of unlawfully selling a narcotic drug,
the penalty which as provided by statute is five years 1-0
life. Cowan's request for jury instruction on the issue of
entrapment was properly refused by the trial court.
Cowan's Motion for New Trial was properly denied by
the trial court, for the state adequately met its burden
of proof. The State respectfully submits that Cowan's
conviction and sentence be affirmed.
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